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INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is the locating of computing resources on the Internet
in a fashion that makes them highly dynamic and scalable. This kind of
distributed computing environment can quickly expand to handle a greater
system load or take on new tasks. Cloud computing thereby permits dramatic
flexibility in processing decisions—on a global basis. The rise of the cloud
has also significantly challenged established legal paradigms. This Article
analyzes current shortcomings of information privacy law in the context of
the cloud. It also develops normative proposals to allow the cloud to become
a central part of the evolving Internet. These proposals rest on strong and
effective protections for information privacy that are also sensitive to
technological changes.
This Article takes a comparative focus: it examines legal developments
in the United States and the European Union. As the White House noted
in its 2012 consumer privacy framework, the United States “is a world
leader” in cloud computing.1 While leading cloud companies are U.S.based, the European Union sets strong requirements for flows of personal
data, and these obligations have already had a major impact on U.S. companies. The European Union’s significant role in international decisions
around information privacy has been bolstered by the authority of EU
member states to block data transfers from their country to third-party
nations.2 Such nations include the United States, which the European
Union generally considers to lack “adequate” privacy protections.3 Moreover,
the European Commission’s release in late January 2012 of its “General Data
Protection Regulation”4 provides a perfect juncture to assess the issue of
privacy in the cloud.
1 WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK
FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL
ECONOMY 6 (Feb. 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf.
2 See Council Directive 95/46, art. 25, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 45-46 (EC) (instructing member

states to permit the transfer of data to a third party country only if the Commission finds that that
country provides adequate protection).
3 See Working Party on the Prot. of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Data,
Opinion 2/99 on the Adequacy of the “International Safe Harbor Principles” Issued by the US
Department of Commerce on 19th April 1999, at 2, (EC) No. 5047/99, WP 19 (May 3, 1999),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/1999/wp19en.pdf (“reiterat[ing]
its view that the patchwork of narrowly focused sectoral laws and self-regulatory rules presently
existent in the United States cannot be relied upon to provide adequate protection in all cases for
personal data transferred from the European Union”).
4 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General
Data Protection Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Proposed Data Protection
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This Article examines three areas of change in personal data processing
due to the cloud. In doing so, it draws on an empirical study in which I
analyzed the data processing of six major international companies.5 The first
area of change concerns the nature of information processing at companies.
For many organizations, data transmissions are no longer point-to-point
transactions within one country; they are now increasingly international in
nature. As a result of this development, the legal distinction between
national and international data processing is less meaningful than in the
past. Computing activities now shift from country to country depending on
load capacity, time of day, and a variety of other concerns. The jurisdictional
concepts of EU law do not fit well with these changes in the scale and
nature of international data processing.
A second legal issue concerns the multidirectional nature of modern data
flows, which occur today as a networked series of processes made to deliver
a business result. Due to this development, established concepts of privacy
law, such as the definition of “personal information” and the meaning of
“automated processing” have become problematic. There is also no international harmonization of these concepts. As a result, EU and U.S. officials
may differ on whether certain activities in the cloud implicate privacy law.
A final change relates to the shift toward a process-oriented management approach. Users no longer need to own technology, whether software
or hardware, that is placed in the cloud. Rather, different parties in the
cloud can contribute inputs and outputs and execute other kinds of actions.
In short, technology has provided new answers to a question that Ronald
Coase first posed in The Nature of the Firm.6 In that classic essay, Coase
sought to shed light on a fundamental question of corporate organization—
when a firm will produce something for itself, and when it will procure from
another. New technologies and accompanying business models now allow
firms to approach “make or buy” decisions in innovative ways. Different
functions and operations can be packaged as modular units that can be
Regulation], available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_
11_en.pdf.
5 See PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, THE PRIVACY PROJECTS, MANAGING GLOBAL DATA PRIVACY:
CROSS-BORDER INFORMATION FLOWS IN A NETWORKED ENVIRONMENT 13-15 (2009),
available at http://theprivacyprojects.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/The-Privacy-Projects-PaulSchwartz-Global-Data-Flows-20093.pdf. I conducted the study on behalf of The Privacy Projects,
an independent nonprofit organization centered on enhancement of privacy through research and
education. Id. at 3, 71. In this Article, I have also drawn on research regarding developments in
cloud computing subsequent to this study.
6 See generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937), reprinted in
THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 18 (Oliver E.
Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1993).
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pulled apart and reassembled. Yet information privacy law tends to assess
legal responsibility in a static fashion. In particular, privacy law’s approach
to liability for privacy violations and data losses in the new “make or buy”
world of the cloud may not create adequate incentives for the multiple
parties who handle personal data.7
Thus, this Article’s focus is a comparative one from which it explores
significant changes in data processing due to the cloud and the resulting
tension with contemporary information privacy law. This Article concentrates on issues relating to the private ordering of data processing. There
are, therefore, important restrictions on its scope. It discusses neither
national security nor criminal law issues. To be sure, the cloud changes the
ability of intelligence agencies and law enforcement officials to access
personal data, but these matters are conceptually different enough from
those involving purely private parties as to merit separate analysis. This
Article also does not analyze issues that arise when the government uses
cloud services. Here, too, there are distinct policy and legal issues.
I. THE USE OF THE CLOUD
The term “cloud” comes from the traditional representation of the Internet in network diagrams. Network diagrams typically depict in detail the
servers, client PC’s, and routers that are internal to an organization, and
then illustrate the Internet simply with a cloud.8 Over time, people realized
that they could move computer resources that had been inside an organization to the Internet—that is, onto the “cloud.” The National Institute of
Standards and Technology defines cloud computing as “a model for enabling
ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of
configurable computing resources . . . that can be rapidly provisioned and
released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.”9
The cloud has already had an impact on many people. By 2008, the Pew
Internet & American Life Project had found that “[s]ome 69% of online
Americans use webmail services, store data online, or use software programs
such as word processing applications [the] functionality [of which] is located
7 On the “make or buy” decision and how Coase views it as turning on the relative cost of the
use of the market versus the cost of using the firm’s managerial organization, see Harold Demsetz,
Coase, Ronald Harry, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 267
(Peter Newman ed., 1998).
8 ANTHONY T. VELTE ET AL., CLOUD COMPUTING: A PRACTICAL APPROACH 3-4 & fig.1-1
(2010).
9 PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T
OF COMMERCE, SPECIAL PUB. 800-145, THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING 2
(2011), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf.
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on the web.”10 The trend has continued: more people expect that, in the
future, they will access software applications online and share information
through remote server networks rather than on their personal computers.11
The cloud has also been an incredible economic success story. The research firm Forrester forecasts that the global market for cloud computing
“will leap from $40.7 billion [in 2011] to more than $241 billion in 2020.”12 In
Germany, the largest economy in the European Union, investments in and
the services of the 2010 cloud market were worth €1.14 billion.13 This market
is estimated to be worth €3 billion by the end of 2012 and €8 billion by
2015.14 Beyond these statistics, however, a 2012 New Yorker cartoon represents
perhaps the ultimate sign of the cloud’s arrival as a social phenomenon. In
it, a child says to her teacher, “The Cloud ate my homework.”15
In this Part, I analyze how the cloud changes the processing of personal
data by organizations. Three alterations in particular point to the need for
adjustments to information privacy law. The first concerns the increased
international scale of information processing. The second concerns the
development of personal information processing as a networked event.
Continuous, multipoint data flows are now commonplace, and decisions
about information processing, such as those concerning the collection of
data or its transfer, are made in a decentralized fashion through networked
intelligence. Finally, there has been a change in management processes to
allow outsourcing of computing resources. Today, the cloud permits
operations to be packaged as modular units that can be pulled apart and
reassembled in different ways. Contemporary technology permits flexibility
in data processing that was previously unknown. Taken collectively, these
changes suggest the need for modifications to information privacy law.

10 Data Memo from John B. Horrigan, Assoc. Dir., Pew Internet & Am. Life Project,
Regarding Use of Cloud Computing Applications and Services 1 (Sept. 2008), http://www.
pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2008/PIP_Cloud.Memo.pdf.pdf.
11 See JANNA QUITNEY ANDERSON & LEE RAINIE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE FUTURE
OF CLOUD COMPUTING 8 (2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2010/PIP_
Future_of_the_Internet_cloud_computing.pdf (reporting survey results finding that a majority of
respondents expect most people to be working predominantly on the cloud by 2020).
12 See Shane O’Neill, Forrester: Public Cloud Growth to Surge, Especially SaaS, CIO (Apr. 26,
2011), http://www.cio.com/article/680673/Forrester_Public_Cloud_Growth_to_Surge_Especially_SaaS.
13 Press Release, Experton Group, Cloud Computing Startet in Deutschland Durch—
Ausgaben und Investitionen in 2010 Bereits über Eine Milliarde Euro 1 [Cloud Computing Starts
Again in Germany—Spending and Investments in 2010 Already over One Billion Euros] (Oct. 6,
2010), http://www.experton-group.de/fileadmin/experton/press/2010/pm-2010-10-06-Cloud.pdf.
14 Id. at 2 fig.
15 Tom Cheney, Cartoon, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 8, 2012, at 54.
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A. International Processing of Personal Data
In the past, companies generally worked with discrete, localized data sets
and processes. An international data flow was an occasional event—an
exception rather than the rule—and data processing systems were generally
nationally based. From today’s perspective, moreover, these past transfers
were relatively static events—they did not occur continuously and they
involved a fairly limited number of participants in the processing.
The Fiat incident from the late 1980s is a good illustration of this past
model. At that time, Fiat-France sought to transmit human resources information about its employees to its parent company, which was located in
Turin, Italy.16 While Italy had not yet enacted a national data protection
statute, France had such a law in place. The French data protection authority,
the National Commission on Informatics and Liberties (Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés) (CNIL), intervened and issued a formal
declaration that required Fiat-France and Fiat-Italy to sign a contract before
the transfer could occur.17 In this contract, the entities were obliged to
“respect the provisions protecting human rights and fundamental liberties”
required by the Council of Europe’s privacy convention and French data
protection law.18 Once the two Fiat entities had signed the appropriate
contract and presented it to the CNIL, the French data protection agency
gave its formal approval and issued a “receipt” that allowed the transfer.19
The transfer was a limited event—it might as well have involved a one-time
shipment of physical tapes via an international courier.
In the age of the cloud, it would be anachronistic to imagine that a governmental body could issue a formal declaration and a physical receipt
before each international transfer of information. The frequency, complexity,
and volume of global data transfers have grown massively.20 In particular,
16 COMMISSION NATIONALE DE L’INFORMATIQUE ET DES LIBERTÉS, 10E RAPPORT
D’ACTIVITÉ [NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INFORMATICS AND LIBERTIES, 10TH ACTIVITY
REPORT] 32 (1989). Reports of the National Commission are available online back through 1999,
see Rapports d’activité, COMMISSION NATIONALE DE L’INFORMATIQUE ET DES LIBERTÉS,

http://www.cnil.fr/en-savoir-plus/rapports-dactivite/accessible/non (last visited Apr. 10, 2013), but
older reports (including the 1989 report) may be obtained by contacting the site’s administrators at
http://www.cnil.fr/pied-de-page/contactez-nous/contact-webmestre.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 32-34 (original: “respecter les dispositions protectrices des droits de l’homme et des
libertés fondamentales”).
19 Id. at 32 (“récépissé”). For a discussion, see Paul M. Schwartz, European Data Protection
Law and Restrictions on International Data Flows, 80 IOWA L. REV. 471, 491-92 (1995).
20 For an overview of the relatively limited transborder exchanges in the 1980s, see
REINHARD ELLGER, DER DATENSCHUTZ IM GRENZÜBERSCHREITENDEN DATENVERKEHR:
EINE RECHTSVERGLEICHENDE UND KOLLISIONSRECHTLICHE UNTERSUCHUNG [DATA
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we have moved from an age of international transfers of personal data to
one of international processing of personal data. In many instances, the
processing itself takes place within the cloud.
This distributed computing environment permits great flexibility in processing decisions—and it does so on a global basis. For example, computing
activities can be shifted from country to country depending on load capacity,
time of day, and any number of other concerns. An influential committee of
EU data protection authorities, the Article 29 Working Party, has explained
this dynamic process: “[C]loud computing is most frequently based on a
complete lack of any stable location of data within the cloud provider’s
network. Data can be in one data centre at 2pm and on the other side of the
world at 4pm.”21 Computing resources are now accessible globally, and the
processing of personal information increasingly occurs through such
distributed resources.
To better understand this shift in global data access and processing, we
may consider an empirical study that I conducted on emerging corporate
data practices across national borders.22 All the companies that participated
in this study did so anonymously and are identifiable solely by an assigned
Greek letter. This study’s Alpha Corporation, a pharmaceutical company,
provides an excellent demonstration of continuous, international data flows.
Alpha had a Global Clinical Data Management team that “implemented
over 350 Electronic Data Capture . . . systems for clinical trials.”23 In 2008,
these clinical trials created more than five million data points, or more than
seventy-two data points every minute.24 Alpha placed dedicated computing
resources in a private cloud created by data servers located around the
world; the resulting network infrastructure was for the exclusive use of this
single organization with multiple business units. Alpha Corporation’s data
transfers followed its system requirements concerning technology, operations,
resources, and administration.25 In the absence of the cloud, this kind of
intensive international data processing would simply not have been possible.

PRIVACY IN CROSS-BORDER DATA TRAFFIC: A COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS OF LAW
ANALYSIS] § 3, at 108-29 (1990).
21 Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing 17, (EC) No.
01037/12, WP 196 (July 1, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/
documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2012/wp196_en.pdf.
22 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 5; see also supra note 5.
23 SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 13.
24 Id.
25 As Alpha Corporation stated, “Canadian systems might back up to a European-based
server, even though the systems are geographically much closer to a United States server.” Id. at 20.
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B. Networked Data Processes
In the past model, a processing decision occurred at a discrete moment
and involved a unidirectional transfer of data. Companies would also finalize
data processing plans in advance. Today, networked series of data processes
allow the decentralization of decisions about information processing.
The Fiat incident, discussed above, provides a good illustration of this
kind of static process characteristic of practices in the past. Fiat leadership
planned a transfer involving a database of human resource information
exclusively through a single channel from France to Italy.26 Today, however,
as the Article 29 Working Party notes, “The cloud client is . . . rarely in a
position to be able to know in real time where the data are located or stored
or transferred.”27 In many instances, networked intelligence itself shifts data
processing and makes decisions based on its own algorithms’ assessments of
results from past data processing.
Consider Beta Corporation, an international marketing services company
from my study of global data flows.28 In one of Beta’s typical telemarketing
campaigns, planned for Spain, a marketer in Beta’s Spanish office began by
selecting customers to target from a list stored on servers in the United
States, based on criteria developed by a vendor in India.29 The marketer
then transferred the resulting list over the Internet to a call system in
Mexico for execution of the telemarketing campaign in Spain.30 As results
from the telemarketing effort in Spain trickled back to the call center in
Mexico, the data was fed back into the global Customer Relationship
Management system, which then helped to guide the path of the ongoing
marketing campaign by providing frequent and even daily batch updates.31
Beta, like Alpha, relied on the international transmission of personal data to
reach a desired business result. Moreover, the Beta case study also shows
processing decisions being made not in advance, but based on feedback from
networked intelligence.
Epsilon Corporation offers another useful example. At its customer call
centers, Epsilon’s computers analyzed call loads and other relevant factors to
determine how to distribute customer inquiries throughout the world.32
Beyond evaluating load information, the system also drew on networked
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, supra note 21, at 17.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 14.
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information about holidays and working hours in different nations.33 This
latter corporate approach to global workflow, the “follow-the-sun” model,
passes tasks off between sites in different time zones based on where
workdays are in progress.34
Networked intelligence can also be used to improve organizational
decisionmaking: Through analytics, organizations seek to convert their
information into actionable knowledge.35 The cloud can promote the use of
analytics in a number of ways, including through an organization’s use of a
“common knowledge management application” that allows global access to
corporate knowledge.36 It also enables access to “outsourced and offshore
analytical resources.”37
Among nonconsumer uses of this technology, analytics play an important role in healthcare research, the management of physician performance
and clinical metrics, data security, and fraud prevention. The use of analytics
in healthcare research alone has already created great social benefits. There
has been a shift away from traditional clinical trials that follow specific
patients toward informational research that analyzes large data and biological
sample sets. The Institute of Medicine explains these new “information
based” forms of inquiry as “the analysis of data and biological samples that
were initially collected for diagnostic, treatment, or billing purposes, or that
were collected as part of other research projects.”38
This technique, centered on analytics, is widely used today in categories
of research including epidemiology, healthcare services, and public health
services. These information-based forms of health research “have led to
significant discoveries, the development of new therapies, and a remarkable
improvement in health care and public health.”39 As use of electronic health
33
34
35

Id. at 22-23.
Id.
See THOMAS H. DAVENPORT & JEANNE G. HARRIS, COMPETING ON ANALYTICS 7
(2007) (describing analytics as “the extensive use of data, statistical and quantitative analysis,
explanatory and predictive models, and fact-based management to drive decisions and actions”).
For a discussion of the rise of analytics, see Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy, Ethics, and Analytics, IEEE
SECURITY & PRIVACY, May/June 2011, at 66, 66-69.
36 DAVENPORT & HARRIS, supra note 35, at 161.
37 Id. at 180.
38 INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING
PRIVACY, IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH RESEARCH 112 (Sharyl J. Nass et al. eds., 2009).
39 Id. at 113. For example, through analysis of the records of a cohort of 9000 breast cancer
patients, scientists were able to identify the HER-2 oncogene. Scientists then developed a
targeted therapy, Herceptin, that is effective for women with HER-2 breast cancer. Id. at 114. In
another major research effort, started in 2003, “the National Institutes of Health, the Food and
Drug Administration, the drug and medical-imaging industries, universities and nonprofit groups
joined in . . . a collaborative effort to find the biological markers that show the progression of
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information increases, the ability to carry out analytics on medical data will
grow. As one physician stated regarding the willingness in the field of
informatics to take “lots of data” instead of “perfectly controlled data”: “You
can deal with the noise if the signal is strong enough.”40 For example, one
recent retrospective study on over 900,000 patients drew on data from
multiple healthcare systems with different electronic health records.41 The
authors of the paper were able to identify an association between certain
patient characteristics, especially height and body mass index, and “venous
thromboembolic events.”42 The authors concluded that this kind of
information-based research “has the potential to allow population research
with minimal resources—time, people and money.”43
C. Modular Units and Outsourced Services
The third major technological change is that users no longer need to
own technology, whether software or hardware, if it is placed in the cloud.
In one analogy, computer services are now available from the network in the
same way that electricity is available from an outlet.44 The examples of
Alpha, Beta, and Epsilon Corporations demonstrate some of the ways in
which companies draw on cloud services. These organizations used networked servers to store applications and data and permit global access to
these resources by authorized users using multiple devices, whether Macs,
PCs, phones, or tablets. Alpha, Beta, and Epsilon Corporations developed

Alzheimer’s disease in the human brain.” Gina Kolata, Rare Sharing of Data Led to Results on
Alzheimer’s, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2010, at A1. The key element of the project was the commitment
of participants to share all the data from it with the public. The New York Times observed, “The
key to the Alzheimer’s project was an agreement as ambitious as its goal: . . . to share all the data,
making every single finding public immediately, available to anyone with a computer anywhere in
the world.” Id.
40 Peter Jaret, Mining Electronic Records for Revealing Health Data, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2013, at D1.
41 See David C. Kaelber et al., Patient Characteristics Associated with Venous Thromboembolic
Events: A Cohort Study Using Pooled Electronic Health Record Data, 19 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS
ASS’N 965 (2012).
42 Id. at 967-72.
43 Id. at 972; see Bradley A. Malin et al., Biomedical Data Privacy: Problems, Perspectives, and
Recent Advances, 20 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 2, 5 (2013) (“[N]ew computing infrastructures and high-throughput technologies are creating new challenges to privacy that the biomedical
community will need to handle in the not too distant future.”).
44 See, e.g., ARBEITSKREISE TECHNIK UND MEDIEN DER KONFERENZ DER DATENSCHUTZBEAUFTRAGTEN DES BUNDES UND DER LÄNDER, ORIENTIERUNGSHILFE—CLOUD
COMPUTING [WORKING GRPS. OF THE TECH. AND MEDIA CONF. OF DATA PROT. COMMR’S
OF THE FED. & STATE GOV’TS, GUIDANCE—CLOUD COMPUTING] 4 (ver. 1.0, Sept. 26, 2011);
Rama Ramaswami & Dian Schaffhauser, What Is the Cloud?, CAMPUSTECHNOLOGY (Oct. 31, 2011),
http://campustechnology.com/articles/2011/10/31/what-is-the-cloud.aspx.
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“private” clouds: the networked resources that they placed on the Internet
were reserved for internal use and located behind a corporate firewall.45
Over the last five years, however, the billion-dollar development has
been the growth in public clouds. A host of new enterprises have made
these technologies widely available to businesses and consumers alike.
Leading services include Apple iCloud, Dropbox, Google Drive, Microsoft
Skydrive, and Salesforce. Research and development continues; for instance,
Intel has recently introduced a hardware-software cloud solution based on
integration at the processor level.46
Public clouds are based on three different service models. In the accepted
nomenclature, these are known as Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as
a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS).47 In SaaS, the end
user, often a consumer, uses the provider’s applications that run within the
cloud. Clients access these applications through a client interface, such as a
Web browser. Web-based email is an example of SaaS through a client
interface. Another example is Google Drive. In the business world, customer
relationship management applications are the most important use of SaaS;48
Salesforce is a leading vendor in this area.49
In PaaS, the provider delivers a development and deployment stack, in
which the consumer receives integrated software for development and use.
The consumer has control over the deployed applications.50 Examples of
PaaS include the Google App Engine and Force.com, which is the development environment for Salesforce.51 Finally, in IaaS, the consumer can
deploy and run software including operating systems and applications. The
customer of IaaS rents and uses external computing resources instead of
purchasing them and having her own employees maintain them within her
own organization.52 Perhaps the most successful IaaS operation at present is
45 SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 29-30, 33-34.
46 INTEL, SECURITY IN THE CLOUD: INTEL

XEON PROCESSOR E5-4600/2600/2400/1600
(2012), available at http://www.intel.com/content/dam/doc/solution-brief/cloud-computing-securityin-the-cloud-brief.pdf.
47 For these standard definitions, see VELTE ET AL., supra note 8, at 11-16.
48 See Salesforce Product Overview, SALESFORCE, http://www.salesforce.com/products (last
visited Apr. 10, 2013).
49 On the rise of Salesforce, see the account of its founder, MARC R. BENIOFF & CARLYE
ADLER, BEHIND THE CLOUD: THE UNTOLD STORY OF HOW SALESFORCE.COM WENT FROM
IDEA TO BILLION-DOLLAR COMPANY—AND REVOLUTIONIZED AN INDUSTRY (2009).
50 See generally LEE BADGER ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, SPECIAL PUB. NO. 800-146, CLOUD COMPUTING SYNOPSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 6.2–.3 (2012), available at http://www.nist.gov/customcf/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=911075.
51 See VELTE ET AL., supra note 8, at 72-74.
52 See id. at 214-16. This service can also permit “dynamic scaling” to permit immediate access
to more resources as well as a “pay-as-you-go” approach to pricing. Id. at 220. Technically, such
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Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud. Although Amazon is best known as a
leading online retailer of consumer goods, it also sells “resizable compute
capacity in the cloud.”53
Recall the analogy regarding how the cloud supplies computing like
electricity from an outlet. A company or person does not need to buy
machines or software and then manage computer resources to process
personal data. Rather than requiring coordination of these services and
goods within the client firm itself, the cloud permits the client to purchase
computing resources on a “spot market.”54 Companies therefore have new
flexibility in deciding on the shape and form of computing work. As a
result, different functions and operations concerning the processing of
personal information can be packaged as modular units that can be pulled
apart and reassembled.
II. THE MISMATCH WITH INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW
In this Part, I analyze three areas in which there is a regulatory mismatch between cloud services and information privacy law. The first
concerns jurisdiction: Which privacy law should apply to personal information in the cloud? Here, the regulations in the European Union prove
especially complex and confusing. The second area of regulatory tension
concerns a threshold matter around key definitional terms: When should
privacy law apply? Third, the cloud provides new flexibility for companies
seeking to determine whether to manage computing activities inside or
outside their corporate structure: Will law provide incentives to create
adequate safeguards for personal data?
A. Jurisdiction: Which Nation’s Privacy Law Applies?
In the EU model, a nation’s data protection law is expressed in omnibus
privacy statutes.55 These laws establish regulatory standards for privacy with

immediate response to greater demand poses a range of interesting challenges for computer
scientists. Luis M. Vaquero et al., Dynamically Scaling Applications in the Cloud, COMPUTER
COMM. REV., Jan. 2011, at 45, 48-49.
53 Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2), AMAZON WEB SERVICES, http://aws.
amazon.com/ec2 (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
54 Demsetz characterizes “firm-like coordination” as consisting of “[s]pecialization, continuity
of association, and reliance on direction” as opposed to “self-sufficiency and spot markets” for
activities outside of the enterprise. Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, in THE
NATURE OF THE FIRM, supra note 6, at 159, 171.
55 DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 1110 (4th ed.
2011).
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a broad scope; typically, a single omnibus law in an EU member state will
regulate personal data use in the public and private sectors alike.56 Within
the European Union, sectoral laws serve as backup to regulate specific areas
of data use and to increase the specificity of regulatory norms within that
state.57 Sectoral laws might regulate, for example, how telecommunications
companies use personal information.
Unlike the European Union, the United States lacks an omnibus information privacy statute and instead regulates this area through sectoral laws
alone.58 States and the federal government have different statutes for the
public and private sectors. Within the private sector, regulations concentrate
on the data holder and, in some instances, on the type of data. Within the
private sector, for example, there are information privacy laws and regulations for educational records, video rental records, and healthcare records.59
Notwithstanding its scattered provisions today, U.S. law played an important international role in the initial development of information privacy
law. The U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s concept of
“fair information practices” (FIPs), first articulated in 1973,60 has influenced
the development of a common set of high level principles for information
privacy law.61 FIPs “are the building blocks of modern information privacy
law,” albeit expressed somewhat differently in each statute.62
The clear international preference today is to follow the EU approach.
Worldwide, most countries outside the EU have enacted omnibus statutes,
many of which resemble the EU approach to information privacy law.63
Moreover, the international preference has been for the specific variations
of FIPs identified by the European Union.
56
57
58
59

Id.
See Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 908-16 (2009).
See id. at 904-05; supra note 3.
See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006) (providing for family educational and privacy rights); 18
U.S.C. § 2710 (creating a civil action to redress the “[w]rongful disclosure of video tape rental or
sale records”); Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 45 C.F.R. pt. 164, subpt. E
(2012).
60 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 50 (1973) (proposing a regulation to define “fair information practice”).
61 On the historical role of the Department of Health, Education & Welfare’s report, see
DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES 306 (1989).
62 Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1614
(1999). The precise content of the resulting obligations will often differ based on the context of
data processing, the nature of the information collected, and the specific legislative, regulatory, and
organizational environment in which the rules are formulated.
63 See Graham Greenleaf, The Influence of European Data Privacy Standards Outside Europe:
Implications for Globalization of Convention 108, 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 68, 72-79 (2012) (charting
the influence of the EU Directive of 1995 on data protection laws across the world).
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As a further matter, and in contrast to the EU approach, the United
States emphasizes a “notice-and-choice” model for its FIPs. As the Federal
Trade Commission describes this approach, it “encourages companies to
develop privacy notices describing their information collection and data use
practices to consumers, so that consumers can make informed decisions.”64
In the European Union, prominent FIPs require that personal data be
processed only pursuant to a legal basis, that there be an independent data
protection authority in each nation to oversee data use, that there be limits
on automated decisionmaking, and that sensitive data receive additional
protection.65 Such FIPs are not present in the United States—at least not as
formal legal requirements.66 Thus, the United States’ unique path as a
matter of form (no omnibus law) and substance (a limited set of FIPs) has
made it an outlier in relation to the global community.67
In the United States, moreover, the cloud’s dramatic increase in international data transfers has not led to significant regulatory difficulties, or
new complexities, for information privacy law. First, U.S. information
privacy law does not give government officials the power to block international transfers of personal information.68 In the context of the outsourcing
of U.S. information processing to India and other countries, Congress
occasionally evinces concern about this lack of legal restrictions, but it has
yet to enact a law regulating international transfers of personal data.69 In

64 FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: A PROPOSED
FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS, at iii (2010). For a description and critique
of this model, see id. at 19-21 (“[C]onsumers face a substantial burden in reading and understanding
privacy policies and exercising the limited choices offered to them.”); and Schwartz, supra note 62,
at 1621-35 (“[M]ost people are unable to control, and are often in ignorance of, the complex
processes by which their personal data are created, combined, and sold.”).
65 For a description of the EU model of FIPs, see CHRISTOPHER KUNER, EUROPEAN
DATA PROTECTION LAW ch. 2 (2d ed. 2007).
66 While there is no such formal legal requirement, an increasing number of leading U.S.
companies have sophisticated privacy management programs, including a Chief Privacy Officer.
See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63
STAN. L. REV. 247, 261-63 (2011). These processes are not the formal equivalent, however, of EUstyle FIPs.
67 See Greenleaf, supra note 63, at 70-72 (“Increasingly, . . . the USA is the only significant
outrider attempting to defend providing data privacy protection by a patchwork of sectoral laws
(with significant limits to their principles arising from circumstances which may be unique to the
USA) and no national [data protection authority] as a key means of enforcement.”).
68 See Schwartz, supra note 57, at 910-11.
69 Such a proposal was included, however, in an early draft of the bill that later became the
Privacy Act of 1974. See S. 3418, 93d Cong. § 201(a)(6) (1974), reprinted in S. COMM. ON GOV’T
OPS. & HOUSE COMM. ON GOV’T OPS., SUBCOMM. ON GOV’T INFO. & INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS,
94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, at 14 (Comm. Print 1976).
On outsourcing to India and privacy concerns, see SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 55, at 1161-63.
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contrast, the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive requires each member state
to give its data protection authority such power.70 The 2012 Proposed
Regulation on Data Protection permits an international transfer of data
from the European Union only if the Commission has made a finding of
adequacy, use is made of “appropriate safeguards,” or one of its enumerated
exceptions applies to the transfer.71
Second, U.S. law does not generally require that a law regulate information processing before it takes place. No omnibus statute in the United
States contains such a mandate. Personal information processing is freely
permitted unless a law specifically forbids the activity or otherwise sets
parameters on it.72 At the same time, however, there is an increasingly dense
patchwork of laws and regulations in the United States. State information
privacy law is now of increasing importance due to the high level of regulatory activity and the possibilities that companies will simply choose to
organize their information practices to conform to the strictest privacy
standard in the most important jurisdiction for their business.73
To illustrate current state privacy laws, we can begin with those state
data security laws that impose a substantive requirement of “reasonable
security” before any data processing may occur. In California, for example,
any “business that owns or licenses personal information about a California
resident” is required to “implement and maintain reasonable security
procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information, to
protect the personal information from unauthorized access, destruction, use,
modification, or disclosure.”74 Numerous other state laws contain specific
requirements to ensure the safe disposal of personal data.75
70
71

See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 2, art. 25, at 45-46.
Proposed Data Protection Regulation, supra note 4, arts. 41-44, at 69-74. The Proposed Regulation now permits an adequacy determination for less than an entire country, but merely “territory,”
“processing sector,” or “international organization in question.” Id. art. 41(1), at 69.
72 Schwartz, supra note 57, at 908-16 (contrasting an EU approach to information privacy
based on the prevention of harm with a U.S. approach of “regulatory parsimony,” and, in
particular, avoiding unnecessary regulation of information flows).
73 Federal environmental law even sometimes grants one state a special regulatory power; this
phenomenon permits one state to serve as a “superregulator.” Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism
and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1107-14 (2009) (explaining California’s role as a
“superregulator” for mobile source emissions).
74 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5(b) (West 2009).
75 See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 72.004 (West 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 19.215.020 (West 2007); see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW
FUNDAMENTALS 182-83 (2d ed. 2013) (reviewing state data disposal statutes). On the differing
EU and U.S. approaches to data protection, and for an argument that EU officials are operating at
a higher speed in modernizing their laws, see Natasha Singer, An American Quilt of Privacy Laws,
Incomplete, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2013, at BU1.

1638

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 161: 1623

As this California law indicates, moreover, state data security laws and
state data breach notification laws in the United States do apply to non-U.S.
data processors. The question of who is protected by that California statute
is as straightforward as with similar state laws: Is the personal data of a
resident of the respective state involved? The data disposal law cited in the
preceding paragraph, for example, applies to any business that processes
information about a California resident. California’s highly influential
breach notification statute also follows this approach.76 It requires that
“following discovery or notification of the breach in the security of the
data,” the business notify “any resident of California whose unencrypted
personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired
by an unauthorized person.”77 The application of such a law to the cloud
remains straightforward: it depends on whether a data breach involves the
personal data of a resident of California. The location of the entity that
processes the information is irrelevant.
In the European Union, the question of the application of privacy law to
the cloud is more complex. Indeed, numerous commentators have noted the
difficulties of this aspect of EU data protection law. For example, in his
treatise on EU data protection law, Christopher Kuner writes, “The legal
rules for determining whether EU law applies to business activities, if so
which national law, and where jurisdiction lies, are extraordinarily complex,
and involve a number of difficult questions to which there are no definite
answers.”78 In a similar vein, Antonis Patrikios has noted that the 1995 EU
Data Protection Directive’s rules are “particularly problematic in modern
business arrangements of a distributed and truly international nature, such
as . . . cloud computing.”79
For the regulation of the cloud, the two fundamental EU legal documents are the 1995 Data Protection Directive80 and the Proposed Data
Protection Regulation of 2012.81 The Directive, which establishes common
rules for information privacy among EU member states,82 is the most
important privacy regulation in Europe; it has largely replaced the Council

76
77
78
79

See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(a).
Id.
KUNER, supra note 65, § 3.01.
Antonis Patrikios, Application of the Law, in EUROPEAN PRIVACY: LAW AND PRACTICE
FOR DATA PROTECTION PROFESSIONALS 65, 67 (Eduardo Ustaran ed., 2012).
80 See supra note 2.
81 See supra note 4.
82 See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 2, art. 32(1), at 49 (“Member States shall bring into
force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive . . . .”).
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of Europe’s Convention on Data Protection of 1980 as the central document
of European information privacy law. The future of EU privacy law rests
not with the Directive, however, but with the Proposed Data Protection
Regulation.
A popular tool of EU lawmaking, directives are generally “harmonizing”
instruments rather than directly binding commands; they require member
states to enact national legislation that reflects their principles.83 After
enactment of the Data Protection Directive in 1995, all EU member states
enacted conforming legislation.84 In January 2012, the Commission of the
European Union released a Proposed Data Protection Regulation, which
will be directly binding on member states.85 Since the process of enactment
of the Regulation will take a number of years, and its final form is unknown,
this Article analyzes the applicable jurisdictional law of the cloud under
both the Directive and Proposed Regulation.
1. The Data Protection Directive (1995)
The Data Protection Directive stakes out a number of bold positions,
including establishing a limit on international data transfers to countries
that lack “adequate” legal protections for personal information.86 The key
provision for this jurisdictional question is the Directive’s Article 4(1)(c).87
Article 4(1)(c) determines when companies with headquarters outside of the
European Union fall under EU data protection law. It applies EU privacy
law to a “controller” who “is not established on Community territory,” but
who “for purposes of processing personal data makes use of equipment,
automated or otherwise, situated on the territory of the said Member
State.”88 Yet Article 4(1)(c) raises more questions than it provides answers.
83
84

Schwartz, supra note 19, at 481-82; see, e.g., supra note 82.
For an official list of all the national legislation enacted by EU member states to conform
with the 1995 Data Protection Directive, see National Execution Measures, EUR-LEX, http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:71995L0046:EN:NOT (last visited Apr. 10,
2013). Regarding the drawn-out process of the enactment and amendment of national data
protection law to conform with the Directive, and the remaining differences between the national
laws, see Spiros Simitis, Einleitung: Geschichte—Ziele—Prinzipien, in NOMOS KOMMENTAR:
BUNDESDATENSCHUTZGESETZ [NOMOS COMMENTARY: FEDERAL DATA PROTECTION ACT]
169-70 (Spiros Simitis ed., 7th ed. 2011). Thus, even after harmonization, differences can remain in
the laws of member states. For the purposes of this Article, however, it will be enough to
concentrate on the Directive’s approach.
85 See Christopher Kuner, The European Commission’s Proposed Data Protection Regulation: A
Copernican Revolution in European Data Protection Law, 11 PRIVACY & SECURITY L. REP. 215, 216
(2012).
86 See supra text accompanying note 2.
87 Council Directive 95/46, supra note 2, art. 4(1)(c), at 39.
88 Id.
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Indeed, as Kuner remarks, “No provision” of the entire Directive “has
caused more controversy than Article 4(1)(c).”89
a. Who Is a Controller?
In the terminology of EU information privacy law, a “controller” is a
“natural or legal person . . . or any other body” that “determines the purposes
and means of the processing of personal data.”90 More specifically, EU law
defines the controller as the entity who decides how personal data is collected, stored, used, altered, or disclosed.91 Controllers have far more legal
obligations and responsibilities than processors. As the Article 29 Working
Party summarizes, “[T]he first and foremost role of the concept of controller
is to determine who shall be responsible for compliance with data protection
rules, and how data subjects can exercise the rights in practice.”92 The
European Union draws a contrast in this regard with the “processor” who
merely processes data on behalf of the controller.93
A difficulty for cloud computing is the uncertainty in EU law as to when
a cloud provider is a controller or a processor. A team of researchers at
Queen Mary College of Law, University of London, has carried out an indepth study of this issue.94 As they note, a cloud processor can be a controller,
a processor, or in some instances, both. Under EU privacy law, a cloud
provider is only the processor if there is a separate entity, a user, who
determines the “purposes of the processing” or its essential “means.”95
Under the 1995 Directive, for example, a cloud service is a data controller if
it provides an online calendar where it synchronizes appointments and
contacts across multiple devices.96 Yet “purposes” and “means” of processing
are difficult conceptual categories to apply to cloud computing, where
responsibilities are distributed and then shared and shifted—sometimes in
real time. At a minimum, the legal analysis here must be highly context
specific.97
89
90
91
92

KUNER, supra note 65, § 3.23.
Council Directive 95/46, supra note 2, art. 2(d), at 38.
See id. art. 2(b), at 38 (defining “processing of personal data”).
Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Opinion 1/2010 on the Concepts of “Controller” and
“Processor,” WP 169, (Feb. 16, 2010), at 4 (emphasis omitted), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/
policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp169_en.pdf.
93 Council Directive 95/46, supra note 2, art. 2(e), at 38.
94 See W. Kuan Hon et al., Who Is Responsible for ‘Personal Data’ in Cloud Computing?—The
Cloud of Unknowing, Part 2, 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 3 (2012).
95 Council Directive 95/46, supra note 2, art. 2(d)–(e), at 38.
96 Patrikios, supra note 79, at 73.
97 In this regard, the Article 29 Working Party is less than helpful in its analysis, which simply
finds that “there may be situations in which a provider of cloud services may be considered either
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b. When Is There a “Use of Equipment Situated Within the Territory”
of the European Union?
Just as uncertainty exists as to the terms “controller” and “processor,”
there is little clarity about other concepts found in the Directive’s Article
4(1)(c). For example, the Article’s language regarding “use of equipment”
shows a pre-Internet understanding of information processing. Kuner
observes, “What evidently was not contemplated at the time of drafting was
the existence of a ubiquitous, seamless information network (i.e., the
internet) which, owing to its decentralized nature, would routinely allow
EU citizens to transfer data back and forth to millions of computers
throughout the world.”98 The cloud has further complicated the analysis
regarding the “use of equipment.” Today, when a user in the European
Union draws on the cloud, she can access networked resources, and the
network can draw on the user’s own PC, smartphone, or tablet. In 2005, Joel
Reidenberg had already noted that “more sophisticated computing enlists the
processing capabilities and power of users’ computers.”99 Today, the cloud
permits the user’s own equipment to become part of a processing operation.
The issue becomes even more complex when the “equipment” in question may include software that the cloud provider supplies. Consider the
case of cookies, which are alphanumerical text files installed on a user’s hard
drive. The Article 29 Working Party has declared that EU information
privacy law should regulate cookies as “equipment” that triggers the applicability of EU legal protections.100 In a summary of the relevant law, an
international privacy lawyer has noted how broadly “equipment” can be
defined: “[I]n principle, almost any hardware, software or system could
qualify as ‘equipment situated’ on the territory of a member state.”101 A
2009 amendment to the E-Privacy Directive of 2002 brought cookies under
EU privacy law. It defines the regulated activity as the “storing of information, or the gaining of access to information already stored, in the
terminal equipment of a subscriber or user.”102
as a joint controller or as a controller in their own right depending on concrete circumstances.”
Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, supra note 21, at 8. For some advice from an international
privacy lawyer on how a service provider can remain in the role of a data processor and keep its
customer in the role of the controller, see Lothar Determann, Data Privacy in the Cloud—Myths and
Facts, PRIVACY L. & BUS. INT’L REP., Feb. 2013, at 17, 20 (Myth 10).
98 KUNER, supra note 65, § 3.26.
99 Joel R. Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1951, 1953 (2005).
100 Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Working Document, Privacy on the Internet—An
Integrated EU Approach to On-line Data Protection 28, WP 37 (Nov. 21, 2000), available at http://
ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2000/wp37en.pdf.
101 Patrikios, supra note 79, at 74.
102 Council Directive 2009/136, art. 2, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 11, 30 (EC).
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2. The Proposed General Data Protection Regulation (2012)
On January 25, 2012, the Commission of the European Union released
its Proposed General Data Protection Regulation. This document marks an
important policy shift from a directive to a regulation. In EU law, a directive
requires harmonizing legislation, but a regulation establishes directly enforceable standards.103 Thus, upon enactment, the Data Protection Regulation
will be binding national law within each Member State and will take
precedence over any contrary elements of national information privacy law.104
The Commission wished to shift to a regulation for data protection
because the Directive had not caused sufficient harmonization throughout
the European Union. Due to the Directive’s failure to create uniformity, a
regulation was needed to create legal certainty within the internal market
and to assure a continuing role for the European Union “in promoting high
data protection standards worldwide.”105 In particular, the Directive’s
granting the member states “room for manoeuvre in certain areas” and the
power to issue “particular rules for specific situations” had created “additional cost and administrative burden” for private stakeholders.106 Moreover,
for the Commission of the European Union, the need for more uniform
regulations was acute because “rapid technological developments and
globalisation have profoundly changed the world . . . and brought new
challenges for the protection of personal data.”107 Among the new problem
areas, the Commission pointed to cloud computing, which “may involve the
loss of individuals’ control over their potentially sensitive information when
they store their data with programs hosted on someone else’s hardware.”108
There were also specific harmonization problems relating to the cloud.
Acknowledging the kinds of difficulties under the Directive that this
Article’s preceding section identified, the Commission noted:
The Internet makes it much easier for data controllers established outside
the European Economic Area (EEA) to provide services from a distance and
to process personal data in the online environment; and it is often difficult

103 See, e.g., Kuner, supra note 85, at 215, 217; Katerina Linos, How Can International Organizations
Shape National Welfare States?, 40 COMP. POL. STUD. 547, 562 (2007).
104 Kuner, supra note 85, at 216.
105 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data
Protection in the European Union, at 5, COM (2010) 609 final (Oct. 4, 2010).
106 Id. at 10.
107 Id. at 2 (emphasis omitted).
108 Id.
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to determine the location of personal data and of equipment used at any
given time (e.g. in ‘cloud computing’ applications and services).109

In short, the Commission acknowledged the need for a new approach to
privacy in the cloud. The merits of its current proposal are another matter.
The Proposed Regulation will greatly expand the jurisdiction of the European Union’s data protection law over non-EU companies that provide
services through the cloud. Rather than the “use of equipment” benchmark
of the Directive, the Proposed Regulation’s Article 3(2) has two alternate
tests for whether EU data protection law is to apply to data controllers not
established in the Union. When the personal data of EU “data subjects” are
processed, the Proposed Regulation applies if “the processing activities are
related to: (a) the offering of goods or services to such data subjects in the
Union; or (b) the monitoring of their behaviour.”110 These new tests, “the
offering of goods or services” and “monitoring,” will sweep more non-EU
companies offering services through the Internet into the jurisdiction of EU
data protection law.111 At the same time, the Proposed Regulation raises new
questions regarding the future regulation of the cloud.
a. What Is an “Offering of Goods or Services”?
The Proposed Regulation does not provide any further definitions or
explanations of this term. Its language is potentially quite broad, however,
because the cloud is available anywhere in the European Union that an
Internet connection can be found. “Offering” is also broader in applicability
than the potential test of “activities which are directed to” EU residents,

109
110

Id. at 11 (footnote omitted).
Proposed Data Protection Regulation, supra note 4, art. 3(2), at 41. An amendment to the
Proposed Data Protection Regulation from the EU Parliament would further broaden both
requirements. It makes clear that jurisdiction applies even if the “offering of goods and services” is
free of charge. It further alters the wording of the language regarding monitoring of behavior to
“the monitoring of such data subjects.” This proposed amendment is intended to extend the
regulation to not only “the monitoring of the behaviour of Union residents by data controllers
outside of the Union, such as through internet tracking, but all collection and processing of
personal data about Union residents.” Draft Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individual with Regard to the Processing of Personal
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation) (COM(2012)0011—
C7-0025/2012—2012/0011(COD)), No. PR\922387EN.doc, amend. 83, at 63/215 (Jan Philipp
Albrecht rptr., Dec. 17, 2012), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/
documents/libe/pr/922/922387/922387en.pdf; see also id. amend. 82, at 63/215.
111 See Kuner, supra note 85, at 219 (noting that the wording of Article 3(2) has resulted in
“uncertainty”).
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which was the approach found in the leaked “interservice” version of the
Regulation from late 2011.112
b. What Is “Monitoring” of Behavior?
Recital 21 of the Proposed Regulation equates “monitoring” with profiling.113 The consequences of this test for the cloud are potentially farreaching. Any “value added” service that draws on the user’s information is
arguably “monitoring” in this sense. For example, a cloud service that tracks
an individual’s data use to provide additional storage capacity has “profiled”
that person. As a result, EU privacy law will apply to a wide range of
circumstances in which networked intelligence on the Internet shapes
applications and services.
B. Networked Intelligence in the Cloud:
When Does Privacy Law Apply?
A further problem raised by the cloud is how it challenges basic definitions of information privacy law. At a fundamental level, information
privacy law concerns the processing of personal data. Yet, the cloud raises
questions as to the meaning of both “personal data” and the “processing” of
that data.
The basic threshold for the application of privacy law in the European
Union concerns whether “personal data” are present. Personal data is
defined in EU law as information that refers to “identified or identifiable”
persons.114 More explicitly, it states that “an identifiable person is one who
can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an
identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical,
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.”115 As long as the
information refers to identified or identifiable persons, information privacy

112 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data
Protection Regulation), art. 57(2)(a), at 78, version 56 (Nov. 29, 2011) [hereinafter Interservice Draft],
available at http://statewatch.org/news/2011/dec/eu-com-draft-dp-reg-inter-service-consultation.pdf.
113 The Regulation’s test is “whether individuals are tracked on the internet with data processing techniques which consist of applying a ‘profile’ to an individual, particularly in order to
take decisions concerning her or him or for analysing or predicting her or his personal preferences,
behaviours and attitudes.” Proposed Data Protection Regulation, supra note 4, recital 21, at 20.
114 Council Directive 95/46, supra note 2, art. 2(a), at 38. EU data protection law treats “identified” and “identifiable” as equivalent. Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem:
Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1874 (2011).
115 Id.
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law is applicable. The Directive and Proposed Regulation alike share this
approach.
The Proposed Regulation takes the same tack, but provides additional
detail. In this regard, it follows its general path of greater specificity, wherever
possible, compared with the Directive. Under the Proposed Regulation, the
definition of persons “identified” or “who can be identified” turns on the
critical concept of direct or indirect identification by “means reasonably
likely to be used.”116 German law strongly influenced EU law in this area; it
has long looked to “means reasonably likely to be used” in defining whether
or not information is identifiable.117 The Proposed Regulation also sets out
some additional categories relevant to the required analysis: it specifies that
identification may be “by reference to an identification number, location
data, online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical,
physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that
person.”118 This additional specificity provides useful categories for the
required assessment of when information refers to a specific person.
In the United States, the key is whether information relates to an identified person. There is a variety of tests in federal and state statutes and
regulations for deciding when information relates to an identified person.
The law does not require identifiability, and as a general matter, the U.S.
threshold approach to defining personal information is reductionist when
compared with the European Union’s expansionist approach.119 In the
United States, the law typically finds personal information to be at stake
only when the information refers to a currently identified person.120
There are also similarities in both the EU and U.S. legal approaches to
determining the moment when information falls within the scope of
information privacy law. Rather than relying on a fixed line between
personal information and nonpersonal information, both systems establish a
delineation that depends on a number of factors, including technology and
corporate practices.121 Whether information becomes personal information
in a networked environment depends on decisions made throughout the
world, sometimes in real time. It is thus increasingly difficult to decide prior
116
117

Proposed Data Protection Regulation, supra note 4, art. 4(1), at 41.
Ulrich Dammann, Weitere Begriffsbestimmungen, in NOMOS KOMMENTAR: BUNDESDATENSCHUTZGESETZ, supra note 84, § 3, marginal no. 22.
118 Proposed Data Protection Regulation, supra note 4, art. 4(1), at 41.
119 See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 114, at 1872-77 (contrasting the U.S. approach of only
covering “information that refers to a currently identified person” with the EU extension beyond
identified persons to all identifiable persons).
120 Id. at 1873.
121 Id. at 1845-47.
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to certain kinds of cloud data processing whether or not personal data will
be implicated. Thus, the cloud threatens to destabilize the regulatory
approaches to personal information in the European Union and United
States alike.
From the perspective of EU law, the cloud has increasingly become a
“means reasonably likely to be used” and can be considered to make more
information “identifiable.” Yet identifiable information is not yet identified
information—and indeed, some instances in the former category (identifiable) may never fall into the latter (identified). Further, varying risks are
associated with the possible identification of data as opposed to information
already related to an identified person.122
At the same time, the U.S. approach appears too limited. Some information may only be identifiable and not identified, but also bring with it a
substantial risk of identification. For example, on the Internet, at some
point, a person’s online browsing can be tied to her name. For an illustration, consider The Wall Street Journal’s 2012 report on Dataium, an aggregator
of online shopping behavior.123 This company tracks individuals on the web
by placing cookies on their computers. Once a person provides a name or
email to a retailer, such as a car dealer, Dataium is able to tie its analysis of
her web surfing to her identity and display it in the dealer’s database.124 At
some point in its process of observation, Dataium obtains personally
identifiable information of the type that belongs in the identified category.
To address these policy issues, Daniel Solove and I have developed an
approach to personal information that we term “PII 2.0,” for “Personally
Identifiable Information 2.0.” We argue that a category of data that should
be treated as legally equivalent to identified information is “identifiable
information with a substantial risk of being identified.”125 At present,
however, U.S. law does not acknowledge this classification.
Beyond the cloud’s destabilization of existing legal categories of “personal
information” in the European Union and United States alike, there is a
problematic EU restriction concerning “automated processing.”126 The
European Union regulates and limits a wide range of information processing
based on this category, which dates from the early years of data protection
law. This French innovation, beginning with Law 78-17 of January 6, 1978,
122 See id. at 1841-45 (explaining how individuals can be re-identified by putting together
various pieces of de-identified information).
123 Jennifer Valentino-Devries & Jeremy Singer-Vine, They Know What You’re Shopping For,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 8-9, 2012, at C1.
124 Id.
125 Schwartz & Solove, supra note 114, at 1886.
126 Council Directive 95/46, supra note 2, art. 15, at 43.
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on Information Technology, Data Files, and Civil Liberties,127 has been a
part of that country’s data protection law ever since. Restrictions on
automated processing are also found in both the Directive and Proposed
Regulation. As the Proposed Regulation’s Article 20 states:
Every natural person shall have the right not to be subject to a measure . . .
which is based solely on automated processing intended to evaluate certain
personal aspects relating to this natural person or to analyse or predict in
particular the natural person’s performance at work, economic situation,
location, health, personal preferences, reliability or behaviour.128

Due to this language, use of networked intelligence located in the cloud will
frequently be “automated processing” subject to heightened EU data
protection safeguards. In this fashion, the Proposed Regulation creates a
potential threat to socially productive uses of analytics—and ones that do
not raise significant risks of individual privacy harms.
C. “Make or Buy”: Who Is Liable?
Recall the example of the Fiat-France data transfer to Fiat-Italy in 1989.
In that case, the data flow was between branches of the same company in
different countries, and the personal information went from one established
database into another.129 A touchstone marking the change from that kind of
data flow to today’s world is then–IBM CEO Samuel Palmisano’s 2006
essay, The Globally Integrated Enterprise, in Foreign Affairs.130
Palmisano began by setting the revolution in information technology
(IT) that began in the 1970s within the broader context of that era’s liberalization of trade and investment flows. In his view, the IT revolution “standardized technologies and business operations all over the world, interlinking
and facilitating work both within and among companies.”131 The resulting
combination of shared technologies and common business standards, which
were “all built on top of a global IT and communications infrastructure,
changed the sorts of globalization that companies found possible.”132

127 Loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés, JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 7,
1978, p. 227.
128 Proposed Data Protection Regulation, supra note 4, art. 20(1), at 54.
129 See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
130 Samuel J. Palmisano, The Globally Integrated Enterprise, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2006, at
127, 129.
131 Id.
132 Id.

1648

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 161: 1623

International data flows reflect these new possibilities. As Palmisano
generally notes, firms were “actively managing different operations, expertise,
and capabilities so as to open the enterprise up in multiple ways.”133 Not
surprisingly, Palmisano made certain that IBM drew on his insights. In
2005, it sold off certain operations, including its line of ThinkPad laptops,134
and reinvented itself as a “global technology and innovation company.”135 As
IBM’s LinkedIn company profile now explains, “Utilizing its business
consulting, technology and R&D expertise, IBM helps clients become
‘smarter’ as the planet becomes more digitally interconnected.”136 IBM’s
shift to a software and services model also proved to be the path to continuing
financial success for the company.137
At a deeper level, the transformation of IBM reflects how technology
provides new answers to the classic Coasean question of “make or buy.” In
his 1937 essay, The Nature of the Firm, Coase sought to shed light on the
fundamental question of when a firm will produce something for itself and
when it will procure from another. In a conclusion as valid today as when
this essay first appeared, Coase stated that the answer to the “make or buy”
question turned on the extent of a company’s ability to economize on a
variety of transaction costs.138 New technologies and accompanying business
models now allow firms to approach “make or buy” in innovative ways. In
particular, cloud technology permits previously unknown flexibility for
organizations. As the Wall Street Journal put it in a headline, “To Cloud, or
Not to Cloud.”139 This new flexibility allows firms to decide how, when, and
to what extent to structure relationships within their walls, and how, when,
and to what extent to draw on outside parties and the market. In particular,
data flows can be disaggregated and decoupled to allow companies to develop
novel business approaches to operations and activities.
Interestingly enough, Coase thought that technology, or at least the
technology of his day, would generally cause firms to bring more activities
133
134

Id. at 131.
See John G. Spooner & Michael Kanellos, IBM Sells PC Group to Lenovo, CNET (Dec. 8,
2004), http://news.cnet.com/ibm-sells-pc-group-to-lenovo/2100-1042_3-5482284.html (quoting Palmisano’s description of the sale as an opportunity in the “rapidly changing information technology
industry”); Steven Musil, Lenovo Completes Buy of IBM’s PC Business, CNET (May 1, 2005), http://
news.cnet.com/2100-1042_3-5691487.html.
135 IBM, IBM, LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/company/ibm (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
136 Id.
137 Bridget van Kralingen, IBM’s Transformation—From Survival to Success, FORBES.COM
(July 7, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/2010/07/07/ibm-transformation-lessons-leadership-managingchange.html.
138 Coase, supra note 6, at 390-97.
139 Robert Plant, To Cloud, or Not to Cloud, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2011, at R9.
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within their walls. This distinction is critical with regard to the role of the
cloud. In 1937, Coase wrote, “Changes like the telephone and the telegraph
which tend to reduce the cost of organising spatially will tend to increase
the size of the firm. All changes which improve managerial technique will
tend to increase the size of the firm.”140 Coase saw technology, first, as
bringing within a single firm many transactions previously carried out for it
externally by a number of other organizations and, second, as bringing
transactions previously carried out by the market within a single firm.
The cloud points to a different resolution of the question of technology’s
impact. The larger trend today is to permit organizations to keep computing
functions outside their walls—that is, to “buy” and not to “make.” A wide
range of data processing operations can now be kept outside the walls of the
organization and purchased within the “spot market,” as Coase would put it,
such that the Coasean firm can focus on its own expertise. Today, the
Coasean firm can let Salesforce program and run its customer relations
management software from the cloud while the firm concentrates on selling
its products or services. It can take this path by saving its capital resources
by buying computing power from Amazon or Google data centers instead of
building its own. As for cloud companies, they now have their own version
of “make or buy.” These entities are buying chips from Intel and other
hardware directly from Asian manufacturers. In so doing, they can bypass
traditional computer and server manufacturers.141
This resulting world of “buy” has significant implications for information privacy law. It means that Coasean organizations will increasingly
hire outside companies to assist in managing personal data. For the Article
29 Working Party, this trend means “a lack of control over personal data.”142
It stated, “[C]loud clients may no longer be in exclusive control of [personal]
data and cannot deploy the technical and organisational measures necessary
to ensure the availability, integrity, confidentiality, transparency, isolation,
intervenability and portability of the data.”143 In short, the Working Party’s
concern is that the “make or buy” world of the cloud may not create incentives for the multiple parties who handle personal data to provide adequate
privacy and security.

140
141

Coase, supra note 6, at 397.
See Cade Metz, Intel Confirms Decline of Server Giants HP, Dell, and IBM, WIRED (Sept.
12, 2012), http://www.wired.com/wiredenterprise/2012/09/29853.
142 Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, supra note 21, at 2.
143 Id. at 5 (footnote omitted).
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III. SOLUTIONS FOR INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW
In this Part, I propose solutions for the mismatch between the cloud and
existing regulatory paradigms in the European Union and the United States.
The critical problems relate to jurisdiction, core definitional concepts in
information privacy law, and the proper role of contracts.
A. Jurisdiction
As discussed above, EU regulations potentially subject all cloud services
used by an EU resident to the EU’s data protection law. In particular, under
the Proposed Regulation, the new jurisdictional trigger would be the
“offering of goods or data services” or the “monitoring of behaviour.”144 As
we have seen, these proposed standards create notable regulatory ambiguities.
Here, the European Court of Justice provided a helpful perspective in
its 2003 decision regarding questions referred by Sweden from its prosecution of Mrs. Bodil Lindqvist.145 The opinion interpreted certain elements of
the 1995 Data Protection Directive, in particular Article 25,146 in light of
alleged privacy violations caused by Mrs. Lindqvist’s webpage. Her Internet
site contained information to help members of her church prepare for their
confirmation as well as information about her and her colleagues in the
parish,147 including descriptions “in a mildly humorous manner” of her
colleagues’ jobs, hobbies, family circumstances, telephone numbers, and
other matters, including the statement that a “colleague had injured her
foot.”148
The European Court of Justice decided not to apply Article 25’s restrictions on data transfers to Mrs. Lindqvist’s conduct. But it did not reach this
conclusion by parsing terms like “use of equipment” or the other concepts
examined above.149 Rather, the Court of Justice decided that application of
Article 25 would lead to an absurdity. First, it explained,
If Article 25 of Directive 95/46 were interpreted to mean that there is a
“transfer [of data] to a third country” every time that personal data are
loaded onto an internet page, that transfer would necessarily be a transfer to

144
145

See supra note 110.
Case C-101/01, In re Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. I-12992, available at http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=48382&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN.
146 See supra note 2.
147 Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. at I-13002, para. 12.
148 Id. at I-13002, para. 13.
149 See supra Section II.A.
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all the third countries where there are the technical means needed to access
the internet.150

The Court of Justice then pointed to the resulting incongruous outcome:
“[If] even one third country did not ensure adequate protection, the Member
States would be obliged to prevent any personal data being placed on the
internet.”151
A similar absurdity follows if placing personal data into the cloud broadly
subjects all non-EU cloud providers to EU regulation. The difficulty is that
the Proposed Regulation’s concepts of “offering” and “monitoring” are
general enough to permit this interpretation. At the same time, it is appropriate for states to protect the online privacy interests of their citizens. We
should remember Reidenberg’s warning against “Internet separatists” who
would seek legal immunity, or something close to it, for all online activity.152
Three adjustments are necessary to permit protection of privacy by EU
member states while also avoiding creation of a jurisdictional net that is too
wide. The first is to replace “offering” with “directing,” a term from the
earlier “Interservice Draft” Data Protection Regulation.153 The second is to
narrow the definition of “monitored.” The final is to reintroduce the concept
of “transit” of data into the Proposed Regulation.
As noted above, an earlier draft of the Data Protection Regulation
reached only entities located outside of the European Union that were
directing activities to within the European Union and not merely offering
products or services.154 The benefit of this test is that it focuses on whether
a non-EU organization chose to enter the EU market, either by accepting
the Euro as payment for services or transacting business in a different
language than the one it normally uses. Another factor that would point to
directing of a cloud service is a step to facilitate access within the European
Union to the service or product, such as the use of a top-level domain name
of an EU member state. Additional relevant factors for defining “directing
activities” can be developed through reference to EU case law regarding
directing activities to EU residents.155
150
151
152
153

Id. at I-13020, para. 69 (alteration in original).
Id.
See generally Reidenberg, supra note 99, at 1953.
See Interservice Draft, supra note 112, art. 2(2), at 36. For background on this concept, see
id., recitals 14-15, at 20.
154 See supra text accompanying note 112.
155 See, e.g., Joined Cases C-585/08 & C-144/09, Pammer v. Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH &
Co. KG, 2010 E.C.R. I-12520, I-12584, para. 29, I-12589, para. 47 (determining whether the
operation of a website could be considered activity “directed to” a member state). The opinion is
available online in the original German at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
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The second step should be rethinking the concept of “monitoring.” The
danger is that the European Union, in interpreting this term as synonymous
with “profiling,” will view any use of networked intelligence to tailor
services as triggering its regulation. “Monitoring” should be read in a
narrower fashion. Networked intelligence leads to the collection of observations; some of these observations create privacy threats for EU data subjects
and some do not. Ultimately, EU law should restrict its grant of jurisdiction
to situations where these observations are linked to privacy risks.
To this end, the European Union should begin by excluding from the
definition of monitoring certain initial steps of data processors that occur
before they make decisions about a specific person. These steps might
include the collection, integration, and analysis of information.156 For
example, servers can be programmed to reject unsafe browsers.157 This
choice should not, however, be considered “monitoring.” Though it constitutes observation, it does not create a privacy risk for a specific individual,
or in the language of information privacy law, for an “identified” person.
Finally, the EU Data Protection Directive exempts from its grant of jurisdiction situations where data are only in transit. This exception is grafted
onto the Directive’s rules for jurisdiction over a “controller” who uses
equipment situated in the European Union. Jurisdiction is not present when
“such equipment is used only for purposes of transit through the territory of
the Community.”158 Yet the Proposed Regulation drops this concept entirely
from its definition of its territorial scope. In some cloud services, however,
the provider is handling data that is in transit. An example would be IaaS,
where the provider offers server and network components, virtualization,
file systems, and capacity on demand.159 While the provider of these
services should meet data security requirements, such as are found in EU
telecommunications law, the jurisdiction of EU privacy law should not
generally apply to this organization.160
CELEX:62008CJ0585:DE:PDF, as well as in English, at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62008CJ0585:EN: HTML.
156 For a discussion of these concepts in the context of analytics, see Paul M. Schwartz, Data
Protection Law and the Ethical Use of Analytics, 10 PRIVACY & SECURITY L. REP. 70 (2011).
157 See, e.g., MICHAEL BARRETT & DAN LEVY, PAYPAL, A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO
MANAGING PHISHING § 4.1 (2008), available at https://www.paypal-media.com/assets/pdf/fact_sheet/
a_practical_approach_to_managing_phishing_april_2008.pdf (suggesting that servers should reject
“unsafe browsers” that do not block phishing sites).
158 Council Directive 95/46, supra note 2, art. 4(1)(c), at 39.
159 See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
160 Researchers at Queen Mary Law School have taken a different approach to reach a similar
result. They argue that under certain circumstances, such as when a cloud provider merely hosts
data, the provider should not be considered to be either a “controller” or a “processor.” An example
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A comparison with the eCommerce Directive of 2000 is also useful.161
The eCommerce Directive frees an intermediary service provider from
liability if it meets three conditions. The Directive states that an entity that
is a “mere conduit” and simply transmits information should not be held
liable so long as it “(a) does not initiate a transmission; (b) does not select
the receiver of the transmission; and (c) does not select or modify the
information contained in the transmission.”162 Like the idea of exempting a
non-EU controller of equipment from jurisdiction where the equipment
transmits information through the territory of the European Union, the
“mere conduit” test frees from jurisdiction an entity that merely offers
computing from an outlet.
B. Networked Data Processes and PII 2.0
There is a mismatch between the cloud and the respective statutory
definitions of “personal information” in the European Union and the United
States. There is also a problem concerning the definition of “automated
processing” in the European Union. Regarding personal information,
lawmakers in the European Union and the United States should think about
identification in terms of risk level. Here, the Schwartz-Solove model,
Personally Identifiable Information (PII) 2.0, presents a new and useful
approach to defining key threshold terms.
In our view, privacy law should not extend indiscriminately to “identifiable” information, as it does in the European Union, and should not be
limited only to information that currently identifies a person, as it is in the
United States. Personal information should be defined as relating to identified persons, that is, information that “singles out a specific individual from
others.”163 Put differently, a person has been identified when her identity has
been ascertained. At the same time, there should be some protections even
for “identifiable information.”164 The key to understanding this distinction
turns on Fair Information Practices (FIPs), which we have already discussed
in the context of EU-U.S. information privacy law.
The basic toolkit of FIPs in the United States includes (1) limits on information use; (2) data minimization (i.e., limits on data collection); (3)
limits on disclosure of personal information; (4) data quality principles (i.e.,
would be a company, such as Amazon, offering IaaS. They “believe an exemption or exception to
data protection laws is justified” for the mere hosting of data. Hon et al., supra note 94, at 11.
161 See Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EC) [hereinafter “eCommerce Directive”].
162 Id. art. 12(1), at 12.
163 Schwartz & Solove, supra note 114, at 1877.
164 Id. at 1886.
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collection and use only of information that is accurate, relevant, and up-todate); (5) notice, access, and correction rights for the individual; (6) transparent processing systems (i.e., the creation of processing systems that the
concerned individual can know about and understand); (7) security for
personal data; and (8) enforcement mechanisms.165 When information refers
to an identified person, all of the FIPs generally should apply.
As for identifiable data, PII 2.0 would only apply to those FIPs “that concern data security, transparency, and data quality.”166 Data quality, the FIP
that deserves the most explanation, requires organizations to engage in good
practices of information handling. This requirement should be commensurate with the purpose of the information processing: the higher the risks
for the affected individual, the higher the data quality should be. The model
of PII 2.0 also includes an important distinction regarding certain instances
in which identifiable information should be treated like information referring to an identified person. If there is a substantial risk that certain information will lead to identification of an individual, it should be treated as
referring to an identified person.167 From the start, this information should
be shifted from the identifiable to the identified category because of the
significant probability that a party will link it to a person.
Once the concept of PII 2.0 is applied to the cloud, the law will distinguish between “identified” and “identifiable.” Only some of the FIPs will
apply to identifiable information. This approach would give cloud companies
an incentive to invest resources in maintaining information not as identified
data, but in identifiable or even nonidentifiable form. Cloud companies
would benefit from FIPs that become easier to meet as they move away
from identified information. Individuals would benefit because security
threats and other risks from identifiable data are, at least as a general matter,
lower than from identified data.
“Automated processing” raises a problem analogous to that with the
definition of “monitoring” in the context of jurisdiction. As I have noted,
the Proposed Regulation would extend “jurisdiction” when there is a
“monitoring of the[] behaviour” of data subjects.168 I have argued above,
however, that this term should not be applied indiscriminately to any use of
networked intelligence to tailor services. As for “automated processing,”
165 Id. at 1880. On the importance of enforcement interests, see Schwartz, supra note 62, at
1677-79. For a discussion of the historical background of and variations in FIPs, see Paul M.
Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1966, 1969-79 (2013).
166 Schwartz & Solove, supra note 114, at 1881.
167 Id. at 1878.
168 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.

2013]

Information Privacy in the Cloud

1655

here, too, the cloud permits computing intelligence to be located on the
network and to make choices without human intervention. A simple
example, and one generally unproblematic from a privacy perspective, is a
company’s use of computer algorithms to monitor workload and distribute
customer calls in real time among global call centers.169
The law should be concerned with risk based on decisionmaking with
personal data rather than the mere automation of processing choices. More
specifically, in a number of cloud service models, such as PaaS and IaaS, a
cloud provider may not make decisions about the individuals whose personal data it is processing. In PaaS, the client has control over the deployed
applications. IaaS involves a customer renting and using external computing
resources, including operating systems and applications. In these cloud
service models, the law generally should shift responsibility for information
privacy from the cloud provider to its client.
Here, the test should be whether the cloud provider is a “mere conduit”
for the client’s data processing. As we have seen, the eCommerce Directive
provides a test for deciding when intermediary service providers should be
free from liability. Under the Directive, an entity that merely transmits
information is not liable so long as it “does not initiate,” “select the receiver
of,” or “select or modify the information contained in transmission.”170
These are useful inquiries for evaluating when a cloud provider who is
merely offering computing from an outlet should be free of information
privacy responsibilities.
In the case of SaaS, the analysis is more complex. Here, the cloud provider may make decisions based on the personal information of the individual
whose information it processes. As an example, it may serve targeted ads to
individuals who use web-based email services. The focus should be on
having processes in place that are commensurate with the dangers raised by
automatic decisionmaking. In some instances, the risk may be nonexistent
or trivial; in others, it may be substantial.
Within the context of SaaS, more complex issues are raised when a
company combines personal information from different cloud services. EU
data protection authorities have already raised objections to Google’s unified
privacy policy, which took effect in March 2012. The policy permits Google
to combine user data from its different services, including Google Apps,

169
170

See supra text accompanying notes 28-34.
eCommerce Directive, supra note 161, art. 12(1)(a)–(c), at 12.
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such as Gmail and Google Docs, with data from its consumer services, such
as YouTube and Google+.171
According to EU data protection authorities, Google’s new privacy policy
fails to provide clear information to users and engages in an “uncontrolled
combination of data across services.”172 On the transparency point, the
Article 29 Working Party, in an investigation led by the French data protection commission, found that the current policy does not permit a user “to
determine which categories of personal data are processed . . . and the exact
purposes for which these data are processed.”173 Regarding the sharing
across different services, the EU data protection authorities found, “The
new Privacy Policy allows Google to combine almost any data from any
services for any purposes.”174
In response, Google pointed to its use of “contextual in-product notices,
in conjunction along with [its] overarching Privacy Policy.”175 In Google’s
view, the key test was “the totality of the information Google provides its
users and how [it] delivers it.”176 Google also pointed to the benefits of
giving users “easy access to their data across Google products” to allow
“them to do useful things.”177 Moreover, it noted that users were still able to
use its search product and YouTube without a Google account.178
The Google–European Union privacy collision is one of the clearest
conflicts yet between U.S. and EU concepts of privacy. Google’s strongest
argument to the EU regulators concerns transparency. It is indeed difficult
to make privacy notices both concise (which encourages readership) and
comprehensive.179 As for the combination of data, from the EU’s perspective,
171 See Google’s New Privacy Policy: Incomplete Information and Uncontrolled Combination of Data
Across Services, COMMISSION NATIONALE DE L’INFORMATIQUE ET DES LIBERTÉS (Oct. 16, 2012),
http://www.cnil.fr/english/news-and-events/news/article/googles-new-privacy-policy-incompleteinformation-and-uncontrolled-combination-of-data-across-ser (criticizing Google’s new privacy
policy as providing “insufficient information” and control to users).
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Letter from Article 29 Data Protection Working Party to Mr. Page 2 (Oct. 16, 2012),
available at http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/en/20121016-letter_google-article_29-FINAL.
pdf. For Google’s privacy policy, see Policy & Principles: Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, http://www.
google.fr/intl/en/policies/privacy (last modified July 27, 2012). For a criticism of Google’s single
privacy policy and its consolidation of the information it collects, see Pamela Jones Harbour, OpEd., The Emperor of All Identities, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2012, at A35.
175 Letter from Peter Fleischer, Global Privacy Counsel, Google, to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin,
Présidente, Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés 2 (Apr. 5, 2012), available at
http://assets.sbnation.com/assets/1045093/20120405_CNIL.pdf.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 3.
178 Id.
179 See id. at 1-2, 5.

2013]

Information Privacy in the Cloud

1657

Google has not made a strong argument simply by pointing to the usefulness of its services or the possibility of a consumer using its products, such
as YouTube, without signing in to the service.
On April 2, 2013, the Article 29 Working Party completed its investigation of Google and finalized its findings of October 2012 regarding the
insufficient aspects of that company’s new privacy policy.180 It declared that
“Google has not implemented any significant compliance measures.”181 The
locus of EU enforcement has now shifted to national data protection
commissions, which will carry out additional investigations pursuant to
their national legislation.182
Google’s adoption of an opt-in approach tailored for each Google service
would be an ideal first step toward solving this conflict. Requiring an opt-in
for combining data will make the consent of a user more likely to be explicit
and informed. In the mobile ad context, for example, Google has begun to
ask users to verify their intentions to click on ads.183 By requiring such
intentionality, Google can increase the amount that it charges for mobile
ads by demonstrating to the businesses that place ads with it that the end
user’s click was not merely the accidental tap of an errant finger.184 Just as
Google is willing to seek such verification to make mobile ads worth more
to its advertisers and to its bottom line, it should strengthen the mechanisms
of consent before permitting data to be combined across its services.
C. Contracts Plus
Instead of reliance on supervised relationships within firms, the cloud
makes possible a new use of the price system. In the context of the cloud,
Coase’s 1937 insights point to the conditions under which companies would
shift from “make” to “buy” for networked computing services. Coase’s
Nature of the Firm predicts this result when the transaction costs of purchase,

180 News: Google Privacy Policy: Six European Data Protection Authorities to Launch Coordinated
and Simultaneous Enforcement Actions, COMMISSION NATIONALE DE L’INFORMATIQUE ET DES
LIBERTÉS (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.cnil.fr/english/news-and-events/news/article/google-privacypolicy-six-european-data-protection-authorities-to-launch-coordinated-and-simultaneo.
181 Id.
182 Eric Pfanner, Google Faces More Inquiries in Europe Over Privacy Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
3, 2013, at B4.
183 Claire Cain Miller, Google Tries a Correction for “Fat Fingers,” N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2012, at
B7; see also Harbour, supra note 174 (expressing “concern[] about Google’s dominant role in data
collection”).
184 See Miller, supra note 183 (noting that advertisers are paying less “for each click . . . in part
because there are more mobile ads that are worth less”).
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including the negotiation of the necessary contracts, are less than the
management costs of computing operations within the firm.185
Here, one can again contrast the EU and U.S. approaches. In the United
States, the law of the cloud, at least for large corporations, is based primarily
on contracts: for most consumers, it is the law of Terms of Service—that is,
take-it-or-leave-it contracts.186 In the European Union, the privacy framework, whether under the 1995 Directive or 2012 Proposed Regulation, does
not permit the contracting out of basic obligations. In the language of
contract law, EU data protection law creates immutable defaults. As Ian
Ayres explains, as a general matter, while most legal rules can be changed
through contract, there is a “smaller class of contract rules that parties
cannot change by private agreement.”187 These rules are used when a
“restriction on contractual freedom is needed to protect (1) parties within
the contract, or (2) parties outside the contract.”188
In the European Union, the privacy framework—whether that of the
Directive or Proposed Regulation—limits the ability to contract out of basic
obligations. This step protects both the parties within the agreement and
those outside. As the Article 29 Working Party states, “[S]tandardised offers
are a feature of many cloud computing services.”189 In its paper on the
privacy implications of the cloud, the Working Party emphasizes the
problem of information asymmetry between cloud providers and most
clients. It finds a “specific risk[]” to be the “absence of transparency” to the
client regarding how her personal data is processed.190 Beyond the need to
protect the parties within the contract, when businesses draft cloud agreements, they may not adequately protect the interests of third parties. The
logic of EU law is that contracts, left alone, will be unable to manage the
resulting privacy and security externalities for consumers.
Moreover, thus far the European Union has proceeded with standards
rather than rules. Standards are more open-ended benchmarks, and rules are

185
186

See Coase, supra note 6, at 390-97.
On the weaknesses of reliance on such take-it-or-leave-it terms, see generally MARGARET
JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW
(2013).
187 Ian Ayres, Default Rules for Incomplete Contracts, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 585, 585 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
188 Id. at 586.
189 Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, supra note 21, at 8.
190 Id. at 5. The Working Party calls for the following policy in response: “Data subjects must
be informed who processes their data for what purposes and to be able to exercise the rights
afforded to them in this respect.” Id. at 2 (footnote omitted).
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more hard-edged and fixed.191 The European Union’s mandatory obligations
for privacy are written in FIPs at a high level of generality. This choice is
wise due to the likely twists and turns of technological change. Yet the
difficulty for the regulation of the cloud is that these general requirements
are also accompanied by a labyrinth of murky doctrines, including those
involving “controllers” and “processors.”192
A key objective for the European Union should be to cut through its
current regulatory thicket. A first move would be to develop model
contractual clauses for data security, transparency, and data quality regarding
all information in the cloud. In this regard, an International Data Corporation
Report, carried out for the European Commission, proposed the creation of
“clear and harmonised principles about cloud service providers’ accountability
and liability.”193 It also sought “the development of a set of standardised
contract terms in order to implement these principles” and called for the
European Commission to “take the lead” in this process.194
In the United States, by contrast, the realm of the cloud is largely contractual, with only limited legal requirements. In the future, more specific
regulation can be expected regarding the content of cloud contracts. At
present, the leading cloud regulations in the United States are state laws
with obligations for data security, data breach security notification, and data
disposal.195 Through these laws, California and other privacy first movers at
the state level are creating a requirement of reasonable security when
personal data are processed.196 In addition, applicable federal statutes in the
healthcare and financial service sectors already provide more specific rules
regarding the safeguards that must be in place when personal information is
processed, including when it is processed in the cloud.197
191 For a discussion of rules and standards in the context of voting technology, see Paul M.
Schwartz, Voting Technology and Democracy, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 625, 655-67 (2002).
192 The European Union also faces the challenge of keeping its provisions for individual
consent from becoming a catch-all to permit any processing of personal data. Hence, the Proposed
Regulation contains notable limits on consent, including forbidding its use to “provide a valid legal
ground for the processing of personal data, where there is a clear imbalance between the data
subject and the controller.” Proposed Data Protection Regulation, supra note 4, recital 34, at 22.
193 DAVID BRADSHAW ET AL., INT’L DATA CORP. (IDC), QUANTITATIVE ESTIMATES OF
THE DEMAND FOR CLOUD COMPUTING IN EUROPE AND THE LIKELY BARRIERS TO UPTAKE
65 (July 13, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/cloudcomputing/
docs/quantitative_estimates.pdf.
194 Id.
195 See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 75, ch. 11 (reviewing state provisions).
196 Cf. id.
197 See, e.g., FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, OUTSOURCED CLOUD COMPUTING
3-4 (2012), available at http://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/media/153119/06-28-12_-_external_cloud_
computing_-_public_statement.pdf; Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy Rules Under the Health
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For an illustration of the future of cloud contracts, one might consider
the wide range of regulatory bodies, beyond legislatures, that are likely to
introduce requirements regarding information privacy and data security.
These requirements will, in turn, affect the permissibility of those contractual
terms and norms that are generated only by the parties to those agreements.
As in the European Union, the language will likely be general, and many of
the standards immutable (or, as Ian Ayres explains, not subject to alteration
through contract). Consider the important guidance of July 2012 from the
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) on outsourced cloud computing activities: The FFIEC agencies, which include the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, consider “cloud computing to be
another form of outsourcing with the same basic risk characteristics and risk
management requirements as traditional forms of outsourcing.”198 It called
on financial institutions that outsource cloud computing “to consider the
fundamentals of risk and risk management.” 199 The resulting obligations for
cloud contracts from the FFIEC start with privacy and data security.200 Yet
the FFIEC also requires financial institutions to engage in due diligence
review, careful vendor management, ongoing audits, information security,
business continuity planning, and “clear identif[ication] and mitigat[ion of]
legal, regulatory, and reputational risks.”201 This language identifies a
sweeping set of elements to be included in cloud contracts.
The analysis is different, however, for consumers who seek to contract
directly for cloud services. There are significant differences in information
available to the parties about critical service issues and how personal
information is used. There are also important differences in market power
in these business-to-consumer relationships. In that context, cloud contracts
enter the realm of one-sided “Terms of Services.” In the United States, a
model law addressing cloud contract privacy would be helpful in providing a
core baseline of protections.

Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
198 FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 197, at 1.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 2-4. As the FFIEC states, “Contracts with the cloud-computing service providers
should specify the servicers’ obligations with respect to the financial institutions’ responsibilities
for compliance with privacy laws, for responding to and reporting about security incidents, and for
fulfilling regulatory requirements to notify customers and regulators of any breaches.” Id. at 4.
201 Id. at 4.
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CONCLUSION
Cloud computing represents an important transformation for personal
information processing. It has made international data transmissions into
frequent occurrences, altered these data flows into multidirectional events,
and allowed companies to purchase computing power and software as
needed. These changes have created challenges to existing legal paradigms,
and this Article has developed a series of proposals in response.
This Article began by looking at EU regulations that might make all
cloud services used by an EU resident subject to EU data protection law.
The Article has proposed modifications to the applicable EU jurisdictional
law and, in particular, to the sweeping rules of the Proposed Draft Regulation. This Article’s proposed test will cover entities “directing” their cloud
activities toward the European Union, or where activities of EU citizens are
“monitored” in the cloud in a fashion that raises privacy risks. Finally, the
Article has recommended that EU law exempt from its general grant of
privacy jurisdiction those cloud activities where data are only in transit.
Second, this Article considered the mismatch between the cloud and the
respective statutory definitions of “personal information” in the European
Union and the United States. Privacy law should not extend uniformly to all
“identifiable” information, as it does in the European Union, and should not
be limited to information that currently identifies an individual, as it tends
to do in the United States. This Article drew on the Schwartz-Solove
concept of PII 2.0 and argued that the law should not view all FIPs as
applying to identifiable data. Here, the FIPs that are relevant apply to data
security, transparency, and data quality. If applied to the cloud, the concept
of PII 2.0 would create an incentive for cloud companies to maintain
information not as identified personal information, but in an identifiable or
even nonidentifiable form. As a related matter, the problematic concept of
“automated processing” in EU law blocks exclusively machine-driven
decisionmaking about persons. The current EU definition of this idea
sweeps too broadly and prevents activities that are unproblematic from a
privacy perspective. As a consequence, lawmakers should narrow the
concept of “automated processing.”
Finally, the cloud marks a rise in firms’ purchasing of computer services
rather than internally incorporating such capacity within their corporate
structure. As a consequence, the legal realm of the cloud relies heavily on
contracts between entities. In the European Union, the privacy framework
seeks to limit the ability of parties to contract out of basic obligations. This
approach can heighten protections of third parties. Greater standardization
of terms is needed in the European Union to simplify the current regulatory
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thicket around complex terms, such as “controller” and “processor.” These
concepts are not useful when applied to cloud arrangements. In the United
States, state laws, such as those for data security breach notification, and
data disposal, have begun to place some substantive limits that apply
regardless of contract. Further regulatory obligations can be expected to
continue to narrow the realm left exclusively to contractual obligations.
There is also a need for a model contract privacy law that would provide a
core baseline of protections in business-to-consumer arrangements. These
suggested reforms will promote strong and effective protection for information privacy and also permit the cloud to become a central part of the
evolving Internet.

